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NOTE
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
At common law, a father was entitled to the custody and
control.of his minor children.' Ths right was absolute, being
based upon the fact that it was his obligation to maintain and
educate them.2 Secondary to the right of the father was the
mother's right to the custody of her children which she could
exercise upon the father's death 3 or upon a showing of his incompetency 4
With this cursory statement of the law pertaining to the
custody of children under the common law, let us consider what
disposition is made of the child today It might be well to
divide the discussiQn into twa.categories. (1) custody of the
child of divorced parents,.and (2) .custody of the child where
there is a dispute between one parent and a third person.
In the case of divorce, it is the well-recognized rule tha'i he
welfare of the child is to govern the decision of the court in
awarding custody 5 and with this policy, Kentucky is in accord. 6
There is a split of authority as to whether or not the court
should divide the custody- of the child equally between its divorced parents. -Some courts have been reluctant to divide the
custody on the ground that the welfare of the child is not promoted by passing him back and forth between parents.7 Where
1

Rallihan v

Motschmann, 179 Ky. 180, 200 S. W

358, 36.1-

(1918), McShan v MeShan, 56 Miss. 413, 415 (1879); People ex rel.

Snell, 77 Misc. Rep. 538, 137 N.Y.S. 193, 194 (1912), Denny v. Denny,.
118 Va. 79, 86,S. E. 835 (1915)..-RalihanNv. Motschmann, 179 Ky. 180, 200 S. W 358 (1918).
'In re Lmdnep's Estate, 13 Cal. App. 208, 109 Pac. 101 (1910)
'Cowls
v; Cowls, 3 Gilman (IM.) 435, 44 Am. Dec. 708 (1846).
5
Lynn v. Lynn, 217 Ala. 190, 115 So. 184 (1928), Beyerle v.
Beyerle, 155 Cal.. 2.66, .100 Pac. 702 (1909); Cohn v. Scott, 231 IM.
556, 83 N. E..191 (1907), Wandersee v. Wandersee, 132 Minn. 321,
156 N. W 348 (1916), Kenner v. Kenner, 139 Tenn. 211, 201 S. W 779

(1918).

6 Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 804, 155 S. W (2d) 220 (1941);
Vanover v Johnson, 201 Ky. 302, 256 S. W 422 (1923), Workman v.
Workman, 191 Ky. 124, 229 S. W 379 (1921), see KRS 403.070.
'See 27 C. J., S. 1169 for a good discussion of this problem,
Caldwell v. Caldwell, 141 Iowa 192, 119 N. W 599, 600 (1909)
"Were the little boy to be regarded as a mere plaything existing
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there is no division of custody, the child, "ifof -hnder years, is
usii~lly given to the mother with the right of visitation by the
father. This always raises the problem of the father who loves
tJ8 child as much as the mother does being compelled to support
the child, perhaps for years, with no compamonship from the
child %except at stated intervals, for example, -once a week or
d..ce a month. As a practical matter, this means that after
some time; the -child and his father drift apart although thefather must continue to carry the burden of supporting a,cld
whom he .never sees and from whom he has no compamonship.
This situation is._unfortunate, but there seems to be no solution
to the father's predicament. However, some courts have held that.
the child&'.best interests are promoted if his custody is divded
and he has the opportunity to share the love and training of bothfather and mother.8 It is to be stressed, however, that in both
lines of decisions, the court bases its findings on the welfare of
the child, even though m deciding what is best for the child,
different conclusions are reached.
Courts almost invariably refuse to divide the custody 'in
cases involving children of tender years. In such cases, as between the parents, the child will be given to the mother, if"
sle
Z a fit person, because her custody is held to be the most condudve to the welfare of the child. 9
'"
alone.for..the pleasure. and entirtainment of his parents, there might
be some 3ustification in changing the jplace of residence twice a year;
but, as his welfare, is of -paramount- importance, he should be accorded, if p:pssiblet, such a home. as will conduce to his physical and
moral well-.being and enable him to acquire a suitable education.
X6 argument is required to'support the proposition that a permanent
abode is for a child's best interest andr-arely, indeed, will a divided
custody by parents who have separated prove beneficial." Davis v.
Davis 289 Ky. 618, 159 S. W (2d) 999 (1942), McNeely v. McNeely,
219",I3: 296, 292 S. W 798 (1927), Cormier v. Cornier, 193 La. 159,
19b-So. 365 (1939). McDermott v McDermott, 192 Minn. 32, 255
N.. W. 247 (1934) Larson v Larson, 176 Minn. 490, 223 N. W 789
(I19).
-.. Belknap v. Belknap, 265 Ky 411, 96 S. W (2d) 1012 (1936),
Adams v,Adams, 281 Mich. 448, 275 N. W 204 (1937), Brock v.
Brbock,.123 Wa~h. 450,'212 Pac. 550, 551 (1923) "In determining what
is for the best welfare of a child of tender years, the courts must'
conside not only food, clothing, shelter, care, education, and envirbnment, but must also bear in mind.that every such child is entitled:
to the love, nurture, advice, and training of both father and mother,
and to deny to the child an opportunity to know, associate with, love,
andbe'loved -by either parent may be a more serious ill than. tp.
refuse
itin some par those things which money can buy."
9
Meffert v. Meffert, 118 Ark. 582, 177 S. W 1 (.1915); Stafford
v. Stafford, 297 Ky. 804, 155 S.W (2d) 220 (1941); Evans v. Evans,
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The rule, that the best interests of the child constitute the
controlling factor guided the Kentucky Court in the recent
decision of Davs v. Davis,10 in which the custody of a four year
old boy was awarded to the mother and the father was merely
allowed to visit the child. The court said.
"It is our view that where both parents are proper and suitable
'tohave the custody of their children and are similarly situated each
should be given the right of custody for as nearly equal a period
as is practical and compatible with the welfare and convenience of
the children. (Citing cases.)
But the disposition of a child of
divorced parents does not rest upon the justification for penalizing
one bf them unless it be that he or she was grievously to blame for
the-breaking up of the home.
It is axiomatic that the true guide
for the court is the welfare of the child. The dominant thought Is
that a child is not a chattel to be disposed of according to the wishes
of either or both of his parents, but is a human being and personality
and is to be treated as such. This rule for disposition of a child is
not only directed by the statute, Section 2123, but by the dictates of
morality and of wisdom born of experience. To that end his custody
may be awarded one parent or the other, or to his grandparents, or
a stranger, according to the circumstances."
When one turns to a situation involving a dispute between
the parent and a third person, the cases may be divided into (1)
those in which there is a custodial contract, and (2) those in
which there is no such contract. One of the leading contract
cases is Bmdges v. Matthews,1 2 in which the father, upon the
death of his wife, by contract gave the child to its maternalgrandmother. Six years later, having remarried and obtained
permanent employment, he sought the custody of his child. The
court held that the grandmother should have the custody because to sever the ties would result in serious injury to the
child. The decision was based on what was best for the welfare
of the child, not upon the fact that a, contract had been made
granting custody to the grandmother.
Although there is such a contract, the court abides by the
rule placing custody where the child will be most benefited. The
presence of a contract does not necessarily influence the chan232 Ky. 155, 22 S. W (2d) 578 (1929); Caudill v. Caudill, 172 Ky.
460, 189 S. W 431 (1916). It is submitted that courts are reluctant
to say specifically at what age "tender years" are at an end. Usually, though, when the child is over eight or ten, it will not be awarded:
to the mother on the basis of its age.
'1289 Ky. 618, 159 S. W (2d) 999 (1942).

"1Id.at 621, 159 S. W (2d) at 1001.
KRS 403.070: In case of divorce, "
having in all such
cases of care and custody the interest and welfare of the children
"
principally in view
-276 Ky. 59, 122 S.W (2d) 1021 (1938)
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cellor one way or the other for the court may ignore the contract1 3 or decree that its terms shall be carried out if they are
14
for the best interests of the child.
Mr. Ferguson, in a note15 written several years ago, concluded that the law in Kentucky in cases not involving custodial contracts is that a surviving parent is entitled to the
custody of a child if he is suited to the trust and that the court
will not impose its own opinion as to what is best for the child.
It is submitted that Mr. Ferguson's thesis is fundamentally fallacious. According to KRS 405.020 the surviving
parent is to have the custody of the child if he is suited to the
trust. But the right of the parent is not absolute and the court
does impose its opinion as to what is best for the interest of the
child. In interpreting this statute, the court said, in the case of
Cummis v Bzrd .16
"
it will be seen that the statute does not confer upon a
parent an absolute right, but conditions the custody of infant children upon the suitability of the particular parent to the discharge of
the duties of the trust. The welfare of the child, consistently with
legal responsibilities, is the controlling consideration on determining
its custody or the suitability of a claimant for the trust."
In that case, even though the father's morals and habits
were unimpeachable and though he was financially secure,
custody was given to the grandmother because the child.'s best
interests demanded such an award. Does not the court then
impose its opinion as to what is best for the child? In determining whether or not the parent is suited for the trust of
keeping the child, the court is deciding what is best for the welfare of the child and making that its chief concern.
It is only natural that the parent ordinarily has more
affection for is child than a third person would have. Consequently, because of an infant's need of love and affection, as well
as his need of physical security and educational advantages, it
236 WILisToN, CONTRACTS (Rev. Ed. 1938) see. 1744A, Bridges v.
Mathews, 276 Ky. 59, 122 S. W (2d) 1031 (1938), Chance v. Pigneguy, et al., 212 Ky. 430, 279 S. W 640 (1926).
11Williston, op. cit.. "
since the welfare of the child is the
determining factor, the court in the exercise of its equitable powers,
may ignore the bargain, whether legal or illegal, and if the custody
of the child has already been transferred may leave it with the
transferee." RESTATEMNT, CONTRACTS (1932) sec. 583.

(1939) 27 Ky. L. J. 790.
-230 Ky. 296, 19 S. W (2d) 959 (1929).
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is logical that the court would look flrst to the parent in placing
custody But, in each case, the court carefully considers the
character and reputation of each of the contestants for custody,
the type of home life offered, educational facilities, financial
status, and environment in general. 1 7 But once it is decided that
the best welfare of the child requires it, the court will not hesitate
to award custody to a third person instead of to the parent.
Thus, the welfare of the child is the primary consideration
of the courts in determining the custody of the infant, whether
as between parents who are divorced, or as between a parent and
third person. It is submitted that because of the state's interest
in children and because each child should have an opportunity to
be reared in the environment which is most conducive to molding
him into a good citizen and individual, this is the only rule
which should be applied where the court must determine custody
HIELEN STEPHENSON

2'Moore et ux. v. Smith, 228 Ky. 286, 14 S.W (2d) 1072 (1929);
Hampton v. Alcorn, 213 Ky. 599, 281 S.W 540 (1926)

